


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China

**REGIONAL AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS**

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CHINA

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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the East Asia/Pacific Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Party Building: Stumbling Blocks

① Peking has launched a major propaganda offensive apparently designed to restore to the party its much-eroded organizational discipline, unity, and prestige, which have suffered greatly as a result of the past several years of factional strife. Stressing the need for tight party unity, strict discipline, and centralized party leadership, a series of broadcasts from Peking on the subject of party building appears to have been designed to pave the way for the long-anticipated 11th National Party Congress.

② There are a number of signs, however, that China's leaders have not yet reached a consensus on the course of rebuilding the party in the wake of the widespread purge of followers of the "gang of four." The 56th anniversary of the party was played down in Peking and mentioned in only eight of China's 29 provinces. In addition, in the July issue of the party's theoretical journal, *Red Flag*, an article written by the mass criticism group of the Hopeh provincial party committee contrasted dramatically with the interpretation by one of the party building broadcasts of the correct theoretical relationship between ideology and organization. The *Red Flag* article emphasized the importance of party organization, claiming that "without party organization there is no party line to speak of," and that party organization is the sole guarantor of the proper implementation of the party line.

① The party building broadcast with which the *Red Flag* article disagreed was written by the People's Liberation Army Military and Political Academy's political science department. The army school's broadcast reminded the listening audience that the correct relationship between ideology and organization--as spelled out earlier by Chairman Mao--was "dialectical" and that one "must not separate political questions from organizational questions." In other words, to emphasize organization at the expense of ideology--or vice versa--is incorrect.

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The low-key observance of party day and the theoretical disagreement between the *Red Flag* article and the army school's broadcast appear to be related to the growing tension between the party and the army (See China Regional and Political Analysis, July 6, 1977). The party obviously wants to ensure strict control over both its civilian subordinates and the army. Elements of the military, however, may be trying to delay party building until an acceptable decision on party-army relations is made. Until such a decision is made, the leadership's efforts at party building will probably proceed slowly.

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Wang En-mao Reports on Kirin

A work report delivered by Wang En-mao, party first secretary of Kirin Province, at the recent party committee plenum provides a clear account of the current struggle against the continuing influence of the "gang of four" in the province. In addition to revealing details of Kirin's current rectification movement, the report illustrates the techniques used to orchestrate the continuing involvement of the central leadership in provincial rectification.

Wang's report delineates three important stages in the development of the rectification movement in Kirin. The first period extends from the time of the purge of the "gang" in October until March, when first secretary Wang Huai-hsiang was removed. Although the report does not criticize the ousted leader by name, it does stress that the failure of the early stages of the campaign against the "gang" and its influence in Kirin was due to "mistakes by the leadership in setting the tone, keeping the lid on, and oppressing the masses." The report also contains harsh criticism of the leadership of the province in the period leading up to the purge. Wang lists the mistakes made by Kirin's leaders:

- Systematically promoting incorrect ideology and slogans.
- Widely distributing speeches by the "gang of four."
- Taking the lead in the criticism of the so-called three poisonous weeds (and thus of Teng Hsiao-ping).

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Such an admission of failure on the part of the party organization stands in contrast to campaigns in other provinces where criticism has been directed against a few individuals. For those officials who, unlike Wang En-mao, made up the provincial leadership at that time, the report's treatment of that period must be quite unsettling.

The second period covered by the report centers on March 1977 when Party Chairman Kuo-feng and the central committee issued instructions on the work in Kirin, removed Wang Huai-hsiang, appointed Wang En-mao, and made it clear that the province had failed to adequately comply with earlier central instructions. Wang's report emphasizes that this was the turning point in the campaign.

The third period, which coincides with an upsurge of provincial activity throughout China's provinces, is linked to Hua's inspection tour of the northeast in late April. At that time Hua, accompanied by Shenyang Military Region commander Li Te-sheng and political security overseer Wang Tung-hsing, inspected the three troublesome provinces of Kirin, Heilungkiang, and Liaoning. According to the report, "Hua personally inspected our province and gave important, unequivocal and incisive instructions" (emphasis added).


Those instructions have been the basis for the conduct of the rectification to this point and are the starting point for the full-scale examination of the party and its work style scheduled by Hua and the central committee for the last half of 1977.

Aside from details of the Kirin campaign, Wang En-mao's report illustrates the involvement of the central authorities, and especially Hua Kuo-feng, in the direction of provincial affairs. While decisions by Hua and the central committee resulted in the appointment of the new first secretary and the issuance of a series of instructions on the provincial rectification, it was Hua himself who personally inspected the province and issued instructions when the progress of the campaign bogged down. The report clearly shows that Hua's instructions are in addition to those issued by the central authorities


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as a group. In the report, Wang criticizes earlier actions for being "antagonistic to Chairman Hua." The overall tenor of the report makes it clear that Wang is delivering this provincial self-criticism to both satisfy the central authorities and to acknowledge the leadership of Hua Kuo-feng. 

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25X1The PLA: Getting Ready for Its 50th Anniversary

① The Chinese will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist armed forces on August 1. Surprisingly, there has been little mention of it in the media, [redacted]
[redacted]

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② Peking is probably having some difficulty determining how to play the event. The party is no doubt reluctant to underscore the importance of the military to Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's government. In addition, the event raises an awkward problem regarding Mao's claim that he founded the PLA. Despite the fact that Mao had trumpeted this claim since the mid-1960s, most party members probably know better. The armed forces were established in 1927 during the Nanchang Uprising. Mao did not participate in this event. The senior party leader in charge of the uprising was Chou En-lai, an historical fact that has been made public since the fall of the leftists and was reiterated by veteran military leader Nieh Jung-chen in an article in the current issue of *China Reconstructs*. In fact, August 1 was chosen in 1931 as the day marking the origin of the armed forces in order to strengthen Chou's prestige and weaken Mao's.

③ Because Chairman Hua is making a strong effort to pattern himself after Mao, any problem relating to Mao could complicate things for Hua. Peking will probably try to finesse the problem by concentrating on the significance of the day and by deemphasizing Mao's claim to have founded the PLA. This solution may be less than satisfactory to those senior military officers who would like to take this opportunity to place more emphasis on the "esteemed and beloved" Chou and less on Mao. [redacted]

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Preparations for a National Meeting On Science and Technology

The Chinese government appears to be making plans for a national meeting later this year to discuss science and technology. Similar national meetings on agriculture and industry were held in 1976 and in the spring of 1977.

Between June 20 and July 7, the Chinese Academy of Sciences held a work meeting to discuss Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's recent directives in which he called for the upgrading of science and technology in China. The participants discussed a draft of an outline plan for the development of scientific research at the Academy of Sciences. Although the contents of the plan have not been revealed, recent discussions of science and technology in the press suggest that it may be similar to the "Outline Report on the Academy of Sciences" drafted in 1975 under orders from Teng Hsiao-ping and condemned in 1976 during the anti-Teng campaign as a "poisonous weed." Many of the themes discussed in the reports about the work conference--the need to study foreign science and technology, to allow freedom of debate in the sciences, to train more scientists and technicians, to improve the quality of basic research in the sciences--were important parts of Teng's "Outline Report." Moreover, an article in *People's Daily* on June 30, published while the Academy of Sciences' work meeting was in session, defended the "Outline Report" and condemned the gang of four for attacking and suppressing it.

There have also been meetings in a number of provinces to discuss Hua's directives on science and technology. (See "New Efforts to Upgrade Science and Technology," RP AC 77-017, 6 July 1977, p. 13-14). Since June 20 at least 16 provinces have held large mobilization rallies to publicize plans to upgrade science and technology, and at least three provincial newspapers have published editorials calling for a "great leap forward" in scientific research in their provinces. In addition, a number of scientific institutions in Peking have been holding symposiums, discussions, and exhibitions

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relating to their research activities. All of these meetings and exhibitions have defined their goal as raising Chinese science and technology to the levels of the most advanced countries by the end of this century.

The enormity of this task was discussed with unusual candor by Chien Hsueh-sen, head of the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Academy of Sciences and one of China's most eminent scientists, in an article in the July issue of *Red Flag*. While maintaining that there are some fields in which Chinese science equals those of the most advanced countries, Chien admitted that "in most cases, we are relatively backward." China had to catch up as rapidly as possible, he said, and could do so only if it began to train its scientists, encourage scientific research, and learn from foreign science and technology.

Although recognizing the backwardness of Chinese science, Chien may have been overly optimistic about China's ability to bring its scientific research program up to world levels by the year 2000. To do so, it will have to overcome a number of major problems. Perhaps the greatest is the lack of highly trained people to carry out sophisticated scientific research programs. Many Chinese scientists were attacked during the Cultural Revolution in the mid 1960s, and some were purged and driven from their jobs. More important, graduate training in the sciences came to a halt, except perhaps in fields related to national defense. The result has been that a generation of Chinese scientists and researchers has been lost. The top positions in the Chinese scientific hierarchy are held by a number of eminent scientists in their sixties and seventies--men like Chien Hsueh-sen and Chang San-chiang, head of the Institute of Mechanics. Most of these scientists were trained abroad and have extensive experience in research and wide foreign contacts. Younger men below them, even those in their fifties, lack such qualifications. With the educational system still in shambles from the errors of reforms made during the Cultural Revolution and with the weak educational backgrounds of students currently entering universities, it is questionable whether China can rapidly produce highly trained and qualified researchers to fill the places of older scientists.

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Military Appointments Clarified

② On July 15, NCNA reported the opening of the fourth army theatrical festival in preparation for the PLA's 50th anniversary celebration. In attendance was Chen Hsi-lien, who was identified for the first time as a member of the Standing Committee of the party's Military Commission (MC). Chen had previously been referred to as a "responsible comrade" of the MC.

③ Although this clarifies Chen's formal title, it does not answer the question of power relationships among the individuals known to be involved in the work of the very important MC. Hua Kuo-feng, of course, is the titular chairman, having taken over from Mao Tse-tung in October 1976. Yeh Chien-ying has been first vice chairman since late 1971, and probably continues to be the most powerful member of the commission. His position as party vice chairman and leading backer of Hua's authority, however, probably leaves him little time to oversee day-to-day MC affairs.

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③ During the June visit of Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, the Vietnamese news agency twice identified Chen as "in charge of the Military Commission," thus further complicating the situation. In addition, Su Yu, former chief of the General Staff and member of the MC Standing Committee, who has been making numerous appearances recently, has been identified as a "leading member" of the MC. Given Chen's Politburo rank, it is likely that Su is in a subordinate position, such as secretary general, but there is still no confirmation of this.

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Taken together, however, the evidence suggests that Chen's current position is a solid one, and, after some political ups and downs, he would now appear to have a good chance of succeeding the aged Yeh Chien-ying as minister of defense and China's most powerful military leader.

Possible New Appointment of the PLA General Staff

② The ordering of the large contingent from PLA headquarters which attended the highly visible PLA ceremony marking the transfer of the ashes of former Fuchou Military Region Commander Pi Ting-chun to the revolutionary heroes cemetery outside of Peking, indicates that the military hierarchy remains in very stable condition, despite the numerous high-level changes in the civilian party apparatus. The only change revealed, in fact, was the probable addition of Wang Cheng, minister of the Fourth Ministry of Machine-Building, to the ranks of the deputy chiefs of the General Staff. If confirmed, Wang will be the first military man with specific technical expertise to have attained a high position on the General Staff since Lin Piao's death in 1971. Although there has been a trend toward upgrading the functional expertise of departmental leaders in the General Staff Department (GSD), most of the rest of the deputy chiefs are career commanders of ground forces.

④ Wang's field of expertise is clearly military communications work, in which he has been involved since the 1930s. Wang was head of the GSD's Communications Department from the mid-1950s until his appointment to head the Fourth Ministry of Machine-Building (responsible for China's electronics industry) in 1963. Though purged in the Cultural Revolution, he was rehabilitated in 1972 and reappointed to the Fourth Ministry sometime after that. With the recent reintegration of the Signal Corps into the GSD and the improvement of China's military communications system, it has apparently been decided that Wang's experience and expertise are needed at the highest level.

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CHINA CHRONOLOGY

July 1

National geology conference opens in Peking. []

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Hua Kuo-feng, Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, and Wang Tung-hsing meet foreign language translators of Volume V of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. []

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Hua Kuo-feng, Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, Chen Hsi-lien, Wang Tung-hsing, and Wu Te meet delegation to national geology conference. []

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Li Hsien-nien meets former US chief of naval operations Elmo Zumwalt. []

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Delegation of the Commission of the European Economic Community led by Roland de Kergolay, vice director of external relations, arrives in Peking for preliminary talks on PRC-EC trade agreement. Meets minister of foreign trade on July 9. []

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Palestinian revolutionary delegation led by Abu Jihad departs China. []

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Wu Te meets with Romanian party delegation. []

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4-13

Romanian economic delegation visits Peking. []

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5-9

Yugoslav Socialist Youth League delegation visits Peking; meets with Li Hsien-nien on July 8. []

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Chen Hsi-lien receives former Fuchou Military Region Commander Pi Ting-chun's ashes, which were sent to Peking one year after Pi's death in an aircraft accident in Fukien. []

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July 7

Editorial in Albanian *Zeri i Popullit* implicitly attacks Mao's "three worlds" theory. [REDACTED]

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Chen Yung-kuei meets US writer William Hinton at Tachai. [REDACTED]

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Albanian attache hosts reception in Peking to mark Albanian army day. [REDACTED]

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Vice Premier Chi Teng-kuei meets Somali delegation led by Hamza Mohamed Gadawcyne, chairman of the Security Bureau of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. [REDACTED]

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Vice Premier Chi Teng-kuei meets with Albanian broadcasting delegation. [REDACTED]

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All vice premiers except Sun Chien attend closing of National Geology Conference. [REDACTED]

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Mid-July

Party leadership conference, apparently Third Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee, begins. [REDACTED]

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Army theatrical festival opens to begin celebration of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the armed forces on August 1. [REDACTED]

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